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Comment/ Sovereign Immunity-The Restrictive
Theory and Surrounding Jurisdictional Issues
"The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of
that which is possessed by the nation as
an independent sovereign power."'
I. RESTRICTIVE THEORY
INHERENT IN THE CONCEPT Of sovereignty is the notion that every nation has
exclusive and absolute jurisdiction over all matters within its borders. This
is equally true for all nations regardless of size or political motivations. Con-
ceptually, therefore, the complete sovereignty of a nation may not be
abridged without its assent, express or implied.2
There is no reason in logic why a foreign sovereign should not be subject
to the jurisdiction of another sovereign within the latter's borders, except as
Chief Justice Marshall states:
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every
sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extraterritorial power, would not
seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects.3
Custom, usage, and expediency, 4 however, require on occasion that a sover-
eign relinquish within its borders a portion of its sovereign power. That the
person of a foreign sovereign is by custom "immune" from arrest within the
borders of another is not open to doubt. The sovereign's representative, his
ambassador, is likewise immune from process,5 as are his ships of war.6
Whether or not it is politically expedient to exempt a foreign sovereign
from the jurisdiction of the courts seems best determined then by the politi-
cal branch of the government, namely the executive. It seems most appropri-
ate that that "department of the government charged with the conduct of
our foreign relations"7 decide whether immunity should be granted a foreign
sovereign.
IThe Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
2 Ibid.
a Supra note 1, at 137 (Emphasis added).
' Chief Justice Marshall phrases it "common interest impelling them to mutual inter-
course." Ibid.
5 Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D. C. Cir. 1965).
e Supra note 1.
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30, 35 (1945).
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In Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, the court declared:
It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has
seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government
has not seen fit to recognize.8
Traditionally the concept of sovereign immunity has been absolute. It has
been deemed always politically expedient (by the courts as well as the execu-
tive) to exempt a foreign sovereign from the jurisdiction of a domestic
court.9 Of course, this tradition stems from the premise that sovereigns, be
they kings, presidents or generals, only perform, from without their borders,
those functions peculiar to a sovereign. These functions usually include the
universally acknowledged responsibilities of state regarding diplomatic ac-
tivity. Professor Friedman, however, in noting the trend away from the ab-
solute theory of immunity states that these changes "stem from a shift in the
practice of modern states regarding the traditional distribution of functions
between governments and private citizens."'10 In other words, a sovereign
buying commodities from a private person and then reselling them to its na-
tionals for profit may not be consistent with the traditional concept of the
function of a sovereign. Therefore, since "international law moves today on
so many levels, it would be surprising indeed if the traditional principles of
inter-state relations developed in previous centuries were adequate to cope
with the vastly more divergent subject matters of international law of the
present day.""
It is the purpose of this comment to discuss the current theory of sovereign
immunity of the United States enunciated in the Tate Letter' 2 and its appli-
cation in Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de A bastecimientos y
Transportes,'3 and Petrol Shipping Corp. v. The Kingdom of Greece, Minis-
try of Commerce, Purchase Directorate.'4 This discussion will center around
the facts of Petrol, which are analogous to Victory, and the jurisdictional is-
sues that emerge.
8 ibid.
0 See e.g., The Schooner Exchange, supra note 1; Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S. S. Pessaro, 271 U.S.
562 (1926); Puente v. Spanish National State, 116 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 627 (1941); Adatto v. United States of Venezuela, 181 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1950) and also
Kahan v. Pakistan Federation, [1951] 2 K.B. 1003.
10 Friedman, Some Impacts of Social Organization on International Law, 50 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 475, 478 (1956).
"Id. at 477.
26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 984 (1952). In the Tate Letter, the State Department stated that
it would recognize the plea of sovereign immunity only in controversies involving the public
acts, jure imperii, of the sovereign but would not recognize such pleas of immunity when the
controversy involved a commercial or private act, jure gestionis, of the sovereign. The Tate
Letter has been commonly recognized as an endorsement of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity.
336 F. 2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
"37 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
1966]
Catholic University Law Review
The Kingdom of Greece, through its Ministry of Commerce, Purchase Di-
rectorate, chartered the vessel, Atlantis, from the Petrol Shipping Corpora-
tion of Delaware to transport grain to Piraeus, Greece. The grain was pur-
chased by the charterer from the United States under the credit provisions
of the Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as
amended.' 5 The charter provided that disputes between the parties should
be arbitrated by three arbitrators in New York, one to be appointed by each
party, and the third to be chosen by the two appointees. The arbitration
clause also provided that, for the purposes of enforcing any award, "this
agreement may be made a rule of the Court."
Petrol Shipping Corporation claimed that the Atlantis was damaged at
the discharge berth in Piraeus through the failure of the Kingdom of Greece
to provide the safe berth required by the charter party and demanded that
the charterer appoint an arbitrator to settle the dispute. When the Kingdom
of Greece declined, the shipowner appointed its arbitrator and, in the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, moved for an order pur-
suant to § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act,16 directing the charterer to ap-
point an arbitrator and proceed with arbitration. Service of process upon the
Kingdom of Greece was purportedly effected by one Lillian F. Clark, who
swore that she had deposited "a true copy [of the notice of motion] thereof
securely enclosed in a post-paid wrapper in a Post Office box ... at No. 26
Broadway, New York 4, N. Y .... 17 The notice of motion was mailed to the
Ministry of Commerce, State Purchase Directorate, c/o Greek Government
Foreign Trade Administration in Washington, D. C., the alleged attorneys
for the Kingdom of Greece, in Washington, and also to the Kingdom of
Greece, Ministry of Commerce, Purchase Directorate at 30 Rockefeller Plaza
in New York. Upon the Greek ambassador's suggestion that the district court
lacked in personam jurisdiction over the sovereign, Judge Dawson dismissed
the petition to compel arbitration.' 8
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court' 9 on the authority of Puente v. Spanish National State.20 Judge
Clark, the author of the Puente decision dissented, however. He was of the
position that the Tate Letter of 1952, announcing the State Department's
15 68 Stat. 454, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1724 (1958), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1736 (Supp. V.
1964).
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
"Brief for Appellant, Appendix, Second Appeal, pp. 19-21, Petrol Shipping Corp. v. The
Kingdom of Greece, Ministry of Commerce, Purchase Directorate, decision pending, Docket
No. 29935, 2d Cir. 1966.
Is This decision is not reported. See Brief for Appellant, Appendix, supra note 17, at pp.
28-29 for the text of the decision.
326 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1964). This appeal was decided by a panel consisting of Judges
Swan, Clark and Marshall.
1116 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 627 (1941).
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adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, left the 1940
Puente decision, decided on the basis of the absolute theory of sovereign im-
munity, without force. Accordingly, Judge Clark would have reversed and
remanded the case in order to ascertain the view of the State Department re-
garding the proper characterization of the sovereign act (public or private)
in this case.
21
Upon rehearing en banc, the court altered the decision of the panel, va-
cated the judgment of the district court, and remanded the case for further
development of the facts.22 At this time the charterer requested the State De-
partment to recognize its assertion of sovereign immunity. The State Depart-
ment refused to recognize such sovereign status and characterized the acts of
Greece as private.
23
Thereafter, while this case was pending in the district court on remand,
the Second Circuit decided Victory which held an agency of Spain subject to
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. In light of the Victory case
and the position of the State Department in this controversy, the district
court granted the shipowner's motion to compel arbitration.
24
The case has been appealed again by the charterer and at this writing is
pending final determination by the Second Circuit after having been briefed
and argued.
The district court's decision in Petrol rested precisely on the holding and
rationale of Victory, and the Second Circuit will most likely follow its prior
Victory opinion and affirm. The soundness of Victory generally has not been
questioned by the commentators25 but has been enthusiastically welcomed.
Perhaps the result should be welcomed, but the rationale of the opinion is
subject to doubt.
26
The primary contention of the Comisaria General in Victory was that, as
an arm of the sovereign government of Spain, it was immune from suit under
well established principles of international law, without the consent it de-
21Supra note 19, at 118-119.
332 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1964).
2 The letter from the State Department expressing its views in this manner is set out in
Brief for Appellee, Second Appeal, pp. 6a-7a, Petrol Shipping Corp. v. The Kingdom of
Greece, decision pending, Docket No. 29935, 2d Cir. 1966.
11 Supra note 14.
See e.g., Comments, Judicial Adoption of Restrictive Immunity for Foreign Sovereigns,
51 VA. L. REv. 316 (1965), and Sovereign Immunity Restricted To Noncommercial Activity,
63 MICH. L. REV. 708 (1965); Note, 53 GEo. L. J. 837 (1965).
"In Memorandum for The United States As Amicus Curia on petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari, p, 5 n. 4, Comisaria General De Abastecimientos y Transportes v. Victory Transport
Inc., 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965), the Solicitor General
tactfully understates:
Although we agree with the courts below that the petitioner [Comisaria General] was
not entitled to prevail in this action, we do not at this stage express an opinion on the
Second Circuit's particular formulation of a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity or
even upon the distinction between governmental acts and commercial or private acts.
1966]
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clined to accord. The court acknowledged the great deal of precedent sup-
porting the Comisaria General's position, citing the landmark case of The
Exchange. The court however did not concern itself with the only decision
by the Supreme Court on the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,
Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S. S. Pesaro,27 where the Court held that:
a ship owned and possessed by a foreign government, and operated by it in the
carriage of merchandise for hire, is immune from arrest under process based on a
libel in rem by a private suitor in a federal district court exercising admiralty
jurisdiction.
2 s
The court noted the apparent trend in foreign countries to restrict sovereign
immunity29 when the sovereign's acts are more "private" than "public". "Be-
cause of the dramatic changes in the nature and functioning of sovereigns ...
the wisdom of retaining the doctrine [of absolute theory of immunity] has
been cogently questioned." 30 The Victory court was also heavily influenced
by the Tate Letter saying: "Through the 'Tate Letter' the State Depart-
ment has made it clear that its policy is to decline immunity to friendly sov-
ereigns in suits arising from private or commercial activity." 3 t In differen-
tiating between acts private, jure gestionis and acts public, jure imperii, the
court observed that the Tate Letter offered no guidelines. It specifically re-
jected as "unsatisfactory" the "nature of the transaction" and "purpose of
the transaction" 32 tests for determining whether the acts are private or pub-
lic.
The court then formulated a very narrow test when it declared "we are
disposed to deny a claim of sovereign immunity that has not been 'recog-
nized and allowed' by the State Department unless it is plain that the activ-
ity in question falls within one of the categories of strictly political or public
27Supra note 9.
11 Supra note 9, 271 U.S. at 570. The Court's omission of Berizzi is not altogether unjustifi-
able for in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 39, Justice Frankfurter, joined
by Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, stated that "If this be an implied recission from
the decision in Berizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro, I heartily welcome it." However, in Hoffman,
supra note 7, at 35 n. 1, the majority stated "we have no occasion to consider the questions
presented in the Berizzi case." The status of Berizzi does seem tenuous though it has never
been overruled.
20 Representatives of twenty nations, not including the United States and the Soviet Union,
met in Brussels in 1926 (the year Berizzi was decided) and signed a convention limiting
sovereign immunity in the area of maritime commerce to ships and cargoes employed ex-
clusively for public and noncommercial purposes. An English translation by the State Depart-
ment of the provisions of the treaty may be found in ALLEN, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN
STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS, 303-308 (1933).
3 Supra note 13, 336 F.2d at 357.
11 Supra note 13, 336 F.2d at 359.
2 The sovereign act is public when the "nature of the transaction" is such that it is an
activity that could not be performed by individuals. It has also been suggested that the
sovereign act be characterized as public when the object of the performance is public in
character. "But this [latter] test is even more unsatisfactory, for conceptually the modem
sovereign always acts for a public purpose." Ibid.
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acts about which sovereigns have been traditionally quite sensitive."33 These
five sensitive areas are "internal administrative acts," "legislative acts," "acts
concerning the armed forces," "acts concerning diplomatic activity," and
"public loans."3 4 It was the court's opinion that if this government wished
to expand or contract these areas it was for the State Department to do so,
not the courts. On the basis of this test, the Comisaria General's acts were
characterized as private and thus sovereign immunity was denied.
The court buttressed its conclusion by stating that this charter party for
the transportation of wheat had all the earmarks of a typical commercial
transaction because Spain used private channels to procure the wheat.
But it may be asked, what are public channels? If the sovereign needs food
for its people in time of national emergency, must it build its own ship? Is it
not required to perform the duty in the most economical manner which, ex-
cept in rare cases, is through "private channels?" Must it subject itself, as a
sovereign, to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States because the
activity does not fit into one of the five categories? At first one might say that
it need merely go to the State Department and, in such circumstances, im-
munity will be granted. Perhaps so, but as the court noted in Victory, what
happens when the sovereign fails to request immunity? The recent en banc
decision in Petrol seems to indicate what the Second Circuit will require of
the sovereign. It reversed and vacated the district court decision and re-
manded for further development of the facts-meaning that the sovereign
should request immunity from the State Department. If the sovereign must
procure prior State Department approval for asserting immunity in the
courts, this should be made explicit either by Congress or the Supreme
Court. The indirect procedure devised in Petrol is not an orderly and expe-
ditious treatment of sovereigns. If this is not to be the policy of the courts,
then the five category test should be broadened perhaps by adding a better
defined "public purpose" test. For example, immunity would be granted
when the transaction in question either comes within the scope of the five
categories or, when the purpose of the transaction is not substantially for
the mere economic profit of the nation.
The unprecedented adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity by the Second Circuit in Victory as contrasted with the specific rejection
of that theory by the Supreme Court in Berizzi creates an uncertainty that
should be clarified by the Court.
Another subsidiary issue emerging from Petrol and Victory against the
background of Berizzi is whether a distinction is to be drawn between actions
in rem and in personam when applying the theories of sovereign immunity.
Supra note 13, 336 F.2d at 360 (Emphasis added).
Ibid.
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Many courts3 5 have held that the status of a sovereign defendant is an ini-
tial bar to the court's acquiring in personam jurisdiction; that the court does
not concern itself with the nature of the transaction because it has no juris-
diction. It is said that only in an action in rem where jurisdiction 36 is based
on the seizure of the res may the court then examine the nature of the trans-
action to determine whether or not to impose liability on the sovereign or
allow him the defense of sovereign immunity. It is the position of the Attor-
ney General that this distinction is unsound.3 7 Again, this issue merits Su-
preme Court review.
II. CONSENT TO JURISDICTION
Notwithstanding the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the argument
is advanced that, in any event, the Kingdom of Greece, in Petrol, consented
to jurisdiction in New York by virtue of the Arbitration Clause in the char-
ter agreement. This was the holding in Victory, affecting Spain, where the
court stated:
We hold that the district court had in personam jurisdiction to enter the order
compelling arbitration. By agreeing to arbitrate in New York, where the United
States Arbitration Act makes such agreements specifically enforceable, the Comi-
saria General must be deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of the court
that could compel the arbitration proceeding in New York. To hold otherwise
would be to render the arbitration clause a nullity. 8
Such an arbitration clause had previously been held to confer jurisdiction
upon United States courts over foreign corporations who had entered into
contracts with United States nationals.8 9 It took little effort for the court in
Victory, which concerned the Spanish Ministry of Commerce, to draw the
analogy, when it stated:
Unless the arbitration clause in this charter differs significantly from the arbi-
tration clauses specifically enforced in the Farr and Orion cases, it is clear that
the court has in personam jurisdiction, for we see no reason to treat a commercial
branch of a foreign sovereign differently from a foreign corporation.40
In effect, therefore, the sovereign is held to have consented to the jurisdic-
U See cases cited supra note 9.
8But see Berizzi, supra note 9, at 576, where the Court held "that the general words of
section 24, clause 3, of the Judicial Code investing the district courts with jurisdiction of 'all
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction' must be construed.., as not intended to
include a libel in rem against a public ship... of a friendly foreign government."87Supra note 26, at p. 11.
USupra note 13, 336 F.2d at 363.
U See Farr & Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental De Navagacion, 243 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1957), and
Orion Shipping and Trading Co. v. Eastern States Petro. Corp. of Panama, 284 F.2d 419 (2d
Cir. 1960).
o Supra note 13, 336 F.2d at 363.
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tion of United States courts prior to any opportunity to assert its immunity
regardless of any State Department ruling after the fact. On its face, the
holding in Victory can only mean that the State Department's ruling grant-
ing immunity would be meaningless if a sovereign had previously agreed to
arbitrate.
The corporations in the Farr and Orion cases, although foreign, were not
branches of government and thus not in any circumstances entitled to sover-
eign immunity. The analogy drawn between those private enterprises and
any sovereign entity is somewhat novel, as well as reminiscent of the fictions
heretofore "evolved" by our courts to reach particular defendants. These
hardly ever provide an adequate answer, rather they simply change the na-
ture of the questionl If it is admitted that a foreign sovereign is generally
immune from suit in our courts, would it not be a better solution to the
problem of immunity to base that determination solely upon the State De-
partment's decision, rather than upon talk of prior "implied waiver"? In
this fashion the executive branch of our government would retain the ulti-
mate control over international relations which the courts keep repeating
it should have.
41
The situation in the Victory and Petrol cases is not to be confused with
that in National City Bank v. Republic of China.42 There, the sovereign was
held not to be immune from defendant's counterclaim by virtue of the fact
that the sovereign had initiated the suit in the United States courts thereby
taking advantage of the judicial system. This, the Court stated, amounted
to a consent to jurisdiction for whatever rights the defendant wished to as-
sert, by way of a defense or a counterclaim. This result seems highly desir-
able from the point of view that the court's jurisdiction over the sovereign
was wholly perfected when it sought redress therein, and that this judicial
jurisdiction is not "severable", so to speak, at the whim of any plaintiff.
Consent in the Republic of China case is by no means intellectually repug-
nant; on the contrary, there is a clear and unequivocal act submitting to
jurisdiction.
On the other hand, consent in the instant case is extracted from the arbi-
tration clause, and is fictional to the same extent that the "absent motorist"
statutes exemplified. 43 It is to be doubted whether it is wise for our courts
to engage in the same fictionalization when dealing with sovereign states as
with domestic litigants. In holding that a sovereign entity, by agreeing to
submit charter party disputes to arbitration in New York, has agreed to sub-
mit to the in personam jurisdiction of a federal court in New York, the court
Sa supra note 7.
348 U.S. 356 (1955).
,8 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The interests are, of course, dissimilar, but the
judicial process is the same.
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in Victory rendered a decision of major significance in international law;
one without precedent in the United States, and contrary to decisions of the
English courts.
The pertinent English decisions hold that a foreign sovereign cannot be
said to have consented to a court's in personam jurisdiction solely by reason
of a prior arbitration agreement made with a private party. To be effective,
a sovereign's consent to such jurisdiction must be coram judice, addressed
to the court at or after the institution of the suit in question. This doctrine
is rooted in the decision of Mighell v. Sultan of Jahore,44 where the plain-
tiff brought her action against the Sultan for breach of promise of marriage.
The Sultan had been travelling incognito using the alias "Albert Baker", of
which deception the plaintiff was unaware at the time the promise was made.
In determining whether the sovereign had elected to submit to the court's
jurisdiction Lord Esher held that the election must be made
when the court is about or is being asked to exercise jurisdiction over him, and
not any previous time .... It follows from this that there can be no inquiry by
the Court into his conduct prior to that date. The only question is whether, when
the matter comes before the Court, and it is shewn that the defendant is an in-
dependent sovereign, he then elects to submit to the jurisdiction. If he does not
the Court has no jurisdiction.
45
In the same case, Lopes, L. J., added:
In my judgment, the only mode in which a sovereign can submit to the jurisdic-
tion is by a submission in the face of the Court .... That he intends to waive his
rights by taking an assumed name cannot be inferred.
4 6
Finally, Kay, L. J., stated, "I should put it thus: the foreign sovereign is en-
titled to immunity from civil proceedings in the Courts of any other coun-
try, unless upon being sued he actively elects to waive his privilege and to
submit to the jurisdiction.'"
4
The foregoing doctrine of the Sultan of Jahore case is applied, in the con-
text of an arbitration agreement, by the House of Lords in Duff Develop-
ment Co. v. Government of Kelantan.48 In the latter case, the sovereign had
granted to the company certain rights of mining, timber cutting and road
building to be exercised within Kelantan. The agreement contained an ar-
bitration clause. Disputes arose and were submitted to an arbitrator pur-
suant to the contract. The arbitrator made an award in favor of the com-
pany and directed the Government of Kelantan to pay. In an English court,
-[1894] 1 Q.B. 149.
15 Id. at 159-160. This case is decided under the "absolute theory" of sovereign immunity.46d. at 161.
'7Id. at 163-164.
8 [1924] A.C. 797.
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the sovereign moved to set aside the award on the ground of error in law
appearing on its face. The motion was denied. Thereafter, upon the com-
pany's application, a court order was entered to enforce the award, which
order was then set aside on the ground that the courts of England had no
jurisdiction over the sovereign state of Kelantan. The main thrust of the
company's argument was that Kelantan had waived its immunity, first, by
assenting to the arbitration clause, and secondly, by moving to set aside the
award. Viscount Cave was of the opinion that an agreement to submit to
jurisdiction was not equivalent to actual submission. He went on to state:
If therefore a sovereign having agreed to submit to jurisdiction refuses to do so
when the question arises, he may indeed be guilty of a breach of his agreement,
but he does not thereby give actual jurisdiction to the Court.49
With respect to the question whether, by applying to set aside the award,
the sovereign impliedly submitted to jurisdiction50 for its enforcement, the
court answered in the negative. The application for leave to enforce the
award is held to be a new and distinct proceeding from the sovereign's mo-
tion to set it aside. In the same decision, Viscount Finlay said:
There is nothing in an agreement for settlement by arbitration to import a
waiver of the right of a sovereign power to refuse the jurisdiction of the English
Courts in an action upon the award.51
Lord Sumner stated that before jurisdiction could attach it was "necessary
to find something voluntarily done by the foreign sovereign in or towards
the Court and to find in what is done something that really evinces an in-
tention to submit. This seems to me to be beyond the limits of presumption
or fiction.. .'52
The Kelantan case probably goes further in applying immunity than our
courts would do today in light of the Republic of China case, supra. Never-
theless, the principle is still set out clearly in the English decision that agree-
ing to submit to arbitration is not equivalent to actual submission to juris-
diction.
More recently, the English courts, in Kahan v. Federation of Pakistan,
5 3
have again re-affirmed their position upon the matter of consent. Here the
plaintiff had contracted with Pakistan to sell it armored tanks and upon
non-payment sued Pakistan for breach. Their contract contained the follow-
ing clause
dId. at 810.
50 Cf. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
1 Supra note 48 at 817.
5 Supra note 48 at 829 (Emphasis added).
0 Supra note 9.
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The interpretation and effect of this agreement shall be construed and governed
by English law and for the purposes of proceedings this agreement shall be
deemed to have been made in England and to have been performed there. The
Government agrees to submit for the purposes of this agreement to the juris-
diction of the English courts. Any legal proceedings and any notices under this
agreement requiring to be served on the vendor or on the Government respec-
tively shall be deemed properly served, if served on the vendor at the address
given at the heading of this agreement or on the High Commissioner for Pakistan
in the United Kingdom at... London. .... 54
The action was dismissed with respect to Pakistan on the ground of sover-
eign immunity.55 In its appeal plaintiff argued that unless it were allowed
to proceed against Pakistan the aforementioned clause of their contract
would be defeated. Plaintiff also submitted, "that if such an agreement does
not constitute a submission to the jurisdiction, no agreement ever can, and
no submission to the jurisdiction could be of any value, if it can be resiled
from at any time."5' 6 The court dismissed plaintiff's appeal, resting its de-
cision upon the Duff case. In so doing, Jenkins, L. J. stated:
There is no doubt that [the contract] does contain an express and unambiguous
agreement on the part of the Government ... of Pakistan to submit, for the
purposes of the agreement, to the jurisdiction of the English courts .... But...
I think it is established beyond question by authorities binding on this court that
a mere agreement by a foreign sovereign to submit to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this country is wholly ineffective if the foreign sovereign chooses to
resile from it. Nothing short of an actual submission to the jurisdiction-a sub-
mission, as it has been termed, in the face of the court-will suffice.5 7
The foregoing English precedents have not been without effect upon the
United States. Indeed, in Compania Mercantil Argentina v. United States
Shipping Board,5 s the United States government agency, when confronted
with the assertion of in personam jurisdiction by an English court in an ac-
tion to compel arbitration under a charter party clause providing for arbi-
tration of disputes in England, urged that the arbitration clause was not a
consent to the court's jurisdiction. The court agreed rejecting the conten-
tion that the Shipping Board had waived its immunity by agreeing to arbi-
trate. The dispute concerned freight charges only; therefore the proceeding
was in personam. In his short opinion Banks, L. J. held:
It requires a great deal more than a submission to arbitration to amount to a
waiver of immunity of the sovereign when he is sued in a court of law in perso-
5 1Id. at 1003-1004.
"There were other named defendants in the complaint.
w Supra note 9, at 1007.
Id. at 1012.
[1924] All E.R. 186
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nam: and I think.., the question of waiver arises when the question of immunity
is raised and can be challenged. 59
There is no precedent in American case law for implying a foreign sover-
eign's consent to the assertion of in personam jurisdiction from an arbitra-
tion clause. Therefore, the foregoing English cases are highly relevant when
seen in the light of international principles of sovereign immunity. Neither
the government of Greece nor its representatives took any action in this
case toward the court itself which indicated an intention to submit to its
jurisdiction. On the contrary, the sovereign specifically informed the district
court that it declined to consent to be sued. For the courts to rest jurisdiction
upon consent in this situation is not only a departure from our own histori-
cal position, but, equally significant, it is a basis yet unrecognized by Eng-
land, with whose jurisdictional standards we traditionally have had much
in common.
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Another area of difficulty in the cases involving foreign sovereigns is service
of process. The function of service is twofold: (1) service of the summons
is an act symbolic of the court's assertion of power over the person of the de-
fendant in the case of in personam jurisdiction; (2) service of the summons
gives the defendant notice of the commencement of a suit.
The agreement of the parties in this case to submit disputes to arbitration
carried with it the requirement of the Federal Arbitration Act that service
of process be made under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.60 Service of
process is covered by Rule 4. Nowhere in Rule 4 is service upon a foreign
sovereign specifically provided for or even mentioned. Of course, service of
process is not significant should the sovereign consent to be sued. The par-
ties could either stipulate that proper service was made, or the sovereign
could waive the requirement. However, service of process is very significant
in cases in which the sovereign is unwilling to be sued, making it necessary
for the plaintiff to serve the sovereign in accordance with Federal Rules not
specifically providing for such service.
Both functions of service, i.e., assertion of power over the person and no-
tice, must be satisfied to give the court jurisdiction in personam. In order to
overcome part of this problem with respect to service, the court in Victory
held that service there was reduced to its "notice giving" function, because
the sovereign was held to have consented to jurisdiction by virtue of the ar-
bitration clause. The court then reasoned, in so many words, that it per-
ceived of no reason why an agency of a foreign sovereign should be treated
id. at 188.
9 U.S.C. § 4.
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any differently than a foreign business corporation for purposes of service
of process. This reasoning, of course, obviates any need to "assert power
over the person of the defendant." In Petrol the court relied upon the Vic-
tory holding that mere notice was required to bring a foreign state within the
court's in personam jurisdiction in an action under the Federal Arbitration
Act. However, the procedure followed in both cases to effect service varied
in significant respects. In Victory an attempt was made to effect service with-
in the purview of Rules 4 (d) (7) and 4 (e) by obtaining an ex parte order
of the court directing that the petition and notice be served by sending cop-
ies through registered mail to the governmental agency in Madrid, Spain.
In Petrol however, Rule 4 was not complied with in any apparent respect.
Indeed, no court order was obtained, and no registered mail was used. Rath-
er, copies of the petition and notice were mailed "in a Post Office box ... at
No. 26 Broadway" 6' 1 to the Greek Embassy and Consulate, and to a law firm
not authorized to accept service.
Although the method employed to effect service of process in Petrol dif-
fered from that used in Victory, it seems reasonable to conclude that, if the
court was correct in holding that Greece had consented to jurisdiction, then
in fact "notice" is the only remaining mandate of the Federal Rules. Assum-
ing this to be the case, there seems to be no reason apart from considerations
of sovereign immunity why an agency of a foreign government should not be
treated as a foreign corporation for purposes of service. Nevertheless, it
might be considered desirable that, at the very least, service be made pur-
suant to a court order under Rule 4 (e). Whatever method is employed, how-
ever, service of process is very much a part of this controversy, as is sover-
eign immunity and the consent theory propounded in Victory. Moreover, a
restrictive theory of immunity does not resolve the issue of service of process
because immunity has no bearing on the problem of how a court acquires
jurisdiction in personam over a foreign sovereign. Granted that the sover-
eign is found amenable to suit by virtue of its prior consent, service then is
properly directed to notice only. Otherwise, the problem is clear. This point
is presented in Oster v. Dominion of Canada 2 where United States property
owners sued for damages to their lands resulting from raising the level of
Lake Ontario through the construction of a dam. The defendant did not
appear, but amici curiae argued in support of the suggestion of no jurisdic-
tion because of improper service of process. Service had been effected by de-
livery of the summons and complaint to the Consul General of Canada in
New York City. Dismissing the action, the court stated:
These are in personam actions and the presence of the defendant is an essential
e1Supra note 17.
62 144 F. Supp. 746 (N.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, per curiam, 238 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1956).
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element of the jurisdiction of this Court .... No authority exists for the service
of process in a manner other than that set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure .... Concededly there is no precedent which recognizes as valid the
type of service of process made here. The argument that these actions came to the
attention of the Canadian authorities and thereby performed their notice-giving
function as referred to in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 . . . is unavailing
since the above decision refers to the function of pleadings rather than to the
function of process .... It is beyond argument that jurisdiction of the person in
this type of action is a necessary requisite to the overall jurisdiction of the Court
to adjudicate the claim submitted. Such jurisdiction must be acquired either by
service of process or by the defendant's appearance .... [S]ervice of process here
[upon a consul] is ineffective to obtain jurisdiction over the person of the de-
fendant.6
The Supreme Court will have an opportunity to hear these issues if the
Second Circuit in Petrol follows Victory, as it apparently will. The Kingdom
of Greece will undoubtedly petition for certiorari, and hopefully the Court
will clarify these substantial issues.
G. A. D.
J. J.M.
13 Id. at 748-749.
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